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Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A
Critical Examination of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence as They
Affect Marital Privilege
Mark Reutlinger*
INTRODUCTION
In late 1972, the United States Supreme Court approved and
sent to Congress the Federal Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates,1 as proposed by the Advisory Committee
appointed by the Chief Justice.2 There was only one dissenter, Jus-
tice Douglas, who questioned both the legal foundation for the Court's
submission of evidentiary rules to Congress, and the wisdom of the
Court's approval of rules whose merits it had not examined. Justice
Douglas suggested that the Court, "so far removed from the trial
arena," had little institutional competence to assess the merits of evi-
* A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of California, Berkeley. Mr. Reutlinger is
a member of the California Bar, a former law professor and the author of a casebook
on the law of Evidence.
1. The Supreme Court's order is set forth in issue No. 5 of the advance pamph-
lets for Volume 34 of the United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition
(1973) at iv. The text of the Proposed Rules follows. Hereinafter reference to the
Proposed Rules shall be to the number of the Rule and its page location in that
advance sheet, to avoid confusion with the pagination of the cases in 34 L. Ed. 2d.
For a brief history of the Rules, see Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: An Introduction and Critique, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 449, 449-52 (1969); Span-
genberg, The Federal Rules of Evidence-An Attempt at Uniformity in Federal Courts,
15 WAYNE L. REV. 1061, 1061-70 (1969).
2. The Advisory Committee was composed of the following judges, scholars
and practitioners: Professors Thomas F. Green, Jr. (University of Georgia), Ed-
ward W. Cleary (Arizona State University), and Dean Charles W. Joiner (Wayne
State University); Judges Simon E. Sobeloff (Maryland), Joe E. Estes (Texas), Robert
Van Pelt (Nebraska), and Jack B. Weinstein (New York); attorneys Albert E. Jenner,
Jr. (Chicago), David Berger (Philadelphia), Hicks Epton (Wewoka, Oklahoma),
Egbert Haywood (Durham, North Carolina), Frank Raichle (Buffalo), Herman
Selvin (Los Angeles), Craig Spangenberg (Cleveland), Edward Bennett Williams
(Washington, D.C.); and Robert S. Erdahl of the Department of Justice. The Com-
mittee was assisted by Professors James W. Moore (Yale University) and Charles
Alan Wright (University of Texas), and The Hon. Albert B. Maris, Chairman of
the Standing Committee On Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States
Judicial Conference. Professor Cleary was the Committee's Reporter, and Mr. Jenner
was its Chairman.
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dentiary rules.8 Said the Justice, who seldom shies from a confronta-
tion with a difficult or controversial issue, the Court is "merely
the conduit to Congress. Yet the public assumes that our imprimatur
is on the Rules, as of course it is.""
Imprimatur or not, Congress proved to be no mere conduit to
the people, and no rubber stamp for the Supreme Court.6 Instead
Congress decreed that the Rules, originally scheduled to go into effect
on July 1, 1973, "shall have no force or effect except to the extent,
and with such amendments, as they may be expressly approved by
Act of Congress."6  Clearly what most concerned Congress, not a
little motivated by current events, was Article V on privileges. For
reasons which will be discussed in detail below, privileges are an ex-
tremely sensitive area of the law. The privilege provisions which
had the greatest political impact upon Congress were, not surprising-
ly, those protecting newsmen's sources (omitted entirely by the Rules)
and "official information" (a late addition to the final draft of the
Rules).' But concern focused as well on other areas of privilege-
on the Rules' elimination of the privilege for doctor-patient commu-
nications and their near-abolition of marital privilege. Indeed, it was
questioned whether privileges were proper subjects of Supreme Court
rule-making at all.8
3. 34L. Ed. 2d, No. 5atv (1973).
4. Id.
5. This was the role that Congress strove to avoid by halting the Rules' progress
until it could examine and act on them in some positive fashion, having seen itself in
the "default" role too often. As William Hungate, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, stated during debate on the bill suspending the Rules:
. ..I believe we felt we were breaking new ground on the proposed evidence
code when compared to prior handling of the bankruptcy rules, the Federal
rules of civil procedure, the Federal criminal rules, all coming into effect
without congressional action. We were hesitant to do that.
119 CONo. REc. 1725 (daily ed. March 14, 1973).
6. 87 Stat. 9 (1973). The original Senate Bill, S.583, introduced by Senator
Ervin, would have delayed the effective date of the Rules from July 1, 1973 to the end
of the present (1973) session of Congress. The House, considering congressional ac-
tion necessary and seeking to avoid enactment by default, amended the bill to suspend
the Rules pending affirmative action by Congress. The Senate ultimately concurred
in that amendment.
7. See, e.g., the debates on S.583 in the House, 119 CONo. RuE. 1721-30 (daily
ed. March 14, 1973). See also note 11 infra. To illustrate the political implications
of these two decisions by the Advisory Committee, the "official information" privi-
lege would prevent disclosure (under most circumstances) of intra-govemmental files,
memoranda and other information in government possession, while the lack of a
newsmen's privilege would facilitate identification and prosecution of those responsible
for "leaking" such information to the public.
8. See 119 CONG. RFc. 1721-30 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973); 119 CoNG. REe.
5002-09 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1973); S. REP. No. 14,,93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
H.R. REP. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Congress was by no means first in questioning the proposed Rules. Numerous
lawyers' groups and commentators, including some members of the Advisory Commit-
1354 [Vol. 61:1353
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This article will touch on all of these aspects of the Rules, but
its primary thrust will be a detailed examination of marital privilege
and the effect its treatment by the Rules will have on the privilege
as it exists today in states such as California. Because the Advisory
Committee's approach to marital privilege is typical of its attitude
toward privileges in general, and because California's codification rep-
resents one of the most recent legislative formulations of the privi-
lege, it is hoped that an inquiry centered upon this relatively apolitical
area of the law of privilege will provide some insight into the more"
general questions raised by Article V.
My initial discussion will concern the overall approach to priv-
ileges taken by the Rules, and some of the criticism it has provoked.
After a brief glimpse at the listory of marital privilege at common
law and in California, I will set out the privilege as it presently exists
tee itself, had already expressed everything from friendly concern to outright alarm at
the course the Rules had taken or were taking. E.g., AMERiCAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAwYERS, REPORT OF Comm=rrEE TO STUDY THE PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR
UNITED STATES Dismicr CouRTs AND MAGISTRATES (1970) [hereinafter cited as ACTL
REPORT]; NEW YoRK TRI LAWYERS PROJECT ON THE PROPOSED FEDERAL. RULEs OF
EVIDENCE, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO THE ADVISORY COM1TTEE'S
PRELImINARy DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1970) [herein-
after cited as N.Y. Ti. LAw. PROJECT]; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE: CIVr § 2402 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MIL.E]; Dun-
ham, Testimonial Privileges in State and Federal Courts: A Suggested Approach, 9
WU..LAumT E L.J. 26 (1973); McNichols, Some Random Thoughts on the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 7 InAuo L.R. 187 (1970); Schwartz, supra note 1; Wein-
stein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of
Evidence, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 351 (1969); A Discussion of the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence before the Annual Judicial Conference, Second ludicial Circuit of the
United States, 48 F.R.D. 39 (1969) thereinafter cited as Second Circuit Conference]
(especially the remarks of Messrs. Berger and Korn); Comment, Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Law of Privileges, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1287 (1969).
See also Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HAv. L. REv. 275
(1962); Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429
(1957); 119 CONG. REC. 5004-06 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1973) (statement of Henry J.
Friendly).
Messrs. Weinstein, Joiner and Berger are members of the Advisory Committee, as
is Professor Green, cited below.
Of course, not all comment has been critical. See, e.g., Green, Highlights of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Ladd, Privileges, 1969
LAW & Soc. ORDER 555. Dean Ladd's remarks are a part of a symposium of distin-
guished commentators, some critical and others complimentary of the proposed Rules,
in 1969 LAw & Soc. ORDER 509.
Many of the Rules aroused little or no opposition, and these will likely be ap-
proved as they stand while Congress deliberates on the more controversial proposals.
See 119 CoNG. REc. 1729 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973).
It is interesting to note that Professor Degnan correctly predicted the precise
course of events which ensued when he warned the drafters of the federal evidence
rules that they should concentrate on less controversial and more pressing reforms and
avoid privileges entirely in state law cases, for "common prudence should tell the
rule makers that reaching for too much may cost them everything." Supra at 301.
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in California's state and federal courts, the changes which would be
wrought by adoption of the Proposed Rules as they now stand, a
critique of those changes and their effects on state law and policy,
and some suggested courses of action. I will not attempt to discuss
in any detail two issues that are extremely important but beyond the
limited scope of the present article: the extent to which the Consti-
tution forbids the abolition of the marital (or perhaps any) privilege
by the federal courts;9 and whether the Supreme Court in fact pos-
sesses the power to promulgate either rules of evidence in general
or rules of privilege in particular.10  However, the advisability-as
opposed to the legality-of the latter course will be a major theme
of the discussion which follows.
One more caveat is in order: This article will not attempt to
justify the concepts of evidentiary privileges or of marital privilege, al-
though their justification will necessarily be discussed. This is not a brief
for a new departure in the law, but a defense of a body of law boasting
several centuries of judicial and social acceptance in virtually every
western nation and every American state. Under such circumstances,
while duration alone has not foreclosed change, it seems that the bur-
den should be on those who would abolish a privilege to justify their ac-
tions, rather than on the privilege's proponents." Thus this Article
will concentrate on the reasons advanced by the Advisory Committee
9. The possibility that the Constitution prohibits abolition of the marital com-
munication privilege might be inferred from a reading of Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). Furthermore, if the Erie doctrine is constitutionally based, and
if privileges are substantive law, the Constitution requires that all state privileges be
retained in diversity litigation. See note 34 infra. See generally Green, Drafting Uni-
form Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 177, 204 n.198 (1967); Hill, The
Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 (1958).
10. Most commentators who have examined the Court's power to adopt rules of
evidence in general have concluded that such power exists. See e.g., Degnan, supra
note 8; Green, supra note 8, at 2-17; Joiner, supra note 8, at 433-35; Ladd, Uniform
Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REV. 692 (1963); Schwartz, supra
note 1; Weinstein, supra note 8. Several other authorities are set out in Judge Wein-
steins article, supra note 8, at 355 n.12.
11. Cf. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDEMCE at 24 (1942); Hawkins
v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958). Apparently the Advisory Committee does
not share this view of the proper burden of persuasion, and in many instances seems
to have placed it on proponents instead of critics of privileges, with at least one
glaring exception: With respect to the privilege for state secrets and official in-
formation, the drafters acted with unseemly haste and undue secrecy in adopting new
and far-reaching protection for every manner of governmental information. The back-
ground of how this expanded privilege, sponsored by the Justice Department, almost
"slipped in the back door" emerges in the Congressional testimony on S.583. 119
CONG. REc. 1727-28 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973). The substance of the last-minute
changes can be seen by a comparison of the Preliminary Draft of Rule 509, 46 F.R.D.
at 272-74, and the interim Revised Draft of the Rule, 51 F.R.D. at 375-76, with the
final version in 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5 at 54-55 (1973).
1-356
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for abolition of martial and other state-created privileges, and a detailed
examination of the soundness of those reasons.
I
THE RULES' APPROACH TO STATE-CREATED PRIVILEGES
The Proposed Federal Rules begin Article V by limiting the
privileges available in federal court to those established by the Rules
themselves (or an Act of Congress) and those compelled by the Con-
stitution.12  In other words, the rules or privilege created by and
existing within a particular state are to be of no force or effect in
federal proceedings, at least to the extent they do not have the ex-
plicit support of Congress, the Constitution, or the Advisory Commit-
tee. Conspicuously missing from the Rules' favored privileges are
those for newsmen's sources, for communications between physicians
and their patients, for anti-marital testimony in civil cases, and for mar-
ital communications.
The rationale behind this virtual abolition (in federal proceed-
ings) of many state-created privileges was first expressed-perhaps
a little too candidly, as it developed-in the Notes to the Preliminary
Draft of the Proposed Rules which appeared in 1969.'1 There the
Advisory Committee stated what it considered to be the arguments
in favor of recognition of state privileges, and its responses thereto.14
The arguments given in favor of recognition were as follows:
[A] state privilege is an essential characteristic of a relationship
or status created by state law; state policy ought not to be frustrated
by the accident of diversity; the allowance or denial of a privilege is
so likely to affect the outcome of litigation as to encourage forum
selection on that basis, not a proper function of diversity jurisdic-
tion. 5
The Note to Proposed Rule 5-01 then submitted the following
"persuasive answers" to these arguments:
The essential characteristic of a privilege is the suppression of in-
formation in judicial or administrative proceedings. No state can
have a deep interest in the suppression of information except on
a constitutional basis, such as self-incrimination, or in a situation
where confidentiality is a necessary adjunct to the obtaining of in-
formation needed by the state, such as accident reports or the iden-
12. Proposed FED. R. Evm. 501, 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5 at 37 (1973).
13. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
Districts Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 243-48 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Prelim. Draft].
14. Id. at 247-48.
15. Id. at 247.
13571973]
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tity of an informer.... Moreover, in any event, a privilege
created by state law can never be perfect in affording complete
security and so must in a sense be illusory, since it will always be
subject to possible disclosure in a federal criminal proceeding, fed-
eral question litigation, or bankruptcy. Nor is there any wrong, in
allowing selection of a court because of the superiority of its proced-
ure for developing the facts, as long as the substantive law applied
is the same."6
These answers proved to be "persuasive" to very few groups or indi-
viduals. The language that especially provoked heated reaction was
that which dismissed state-created privileges as a means of "suppress-
ing information," a practice in which "no state can have a deep inter-
est." In so phrasing its answer, the Advisory Committee demonstrat-
ed a surprising insensitivity to the true nature of privileges, state or
federal. Bar groups17 and commentators' 8 were quick to point out
what most authorities have recognized for centuries: Privileges are not
mere exclusionary rules like those excluding hearsay or certain char-
acter evidence; they are substantive laws created to foster or affect
the conduct and/or status of individuals outside of court. While privi-
leges do exclude certain evidence from a judicial proceeding, this
exclusion is merely a means of effecting a state policy considered
more important; it is never an end in itself. Thus privileged testi-
mony is not excluded because of a defect such as unreliability or irrele-
vance, but because, regardless of its probative value or the effect of
its exclusion on the adjudicatory process, extrinsic social policies require
that it not be compelled or permitted. 9
The true "essential characteristic" of privileges is well illustrated
by an examination of the privilege which is the principal subject of
this article-the marital privilege. There are two distinct privileges
which fall under this general designation: the privilege protecting
marital communications and the privilege as to testimony against a
spouse. As is true of any of the communication privileges, that pro-
tecting against involuntary disclosure of confidential marital commu-
16. Id. [emphasis added].
17. See, e.g., N.Y. TR. LAw PROJECT at iii, 33 ("classic oversimplification"),
118-19; ACTL R PORT at 6-7 & n.11 (denouncing the pejorative flavor of the Ad-
visory Committee's characterization).
18. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 8, at 29-36; McNichols, supra note 8, at 192;
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 470-71. But cf. Ladd, supra note 8, at 572.
19. E.g., C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF TrE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRmcK]; 9 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2408, at 334;
Korn, Second Circuit Conference, supra note 8, at 74-77; Ladd, supra note 10, at 714;
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court To-
day, 31 Tur. L. REv. 101, 110-15 (1956). Many courts have made the same point.
E.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967);
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
1358 [Vol. 61:1353
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nications is intended primarily to encourage such communication and
thereby to preserve and foster an intimate relationship between spous-
es.20 In fact, this rationale was specifically included as a part of the
original codification of the privilege in California. 21
Dean Wig-more formulated four requirements which he consider-
ed to justify creation of a communication privilege: the communica-
tion must originate in confidence; confidentiality must be essential
to the relationship between the communicants; the relationship must
be, in the opinion of the community, a proper object of encourage-
ment by the law; and the injury to that relationship which would
result from disclosure of confidential communications must outweigh
the benefits of disclosure to "the correct disposal of litigation.' 22
Applying these four criteria to marital communications, Wigmore
found that all were satisfied2 3 and the privilege amply justified.
The rationale for the testimonial privilege is similar-protection
of the marital relationship-but with the emphasis on avoiding dis-
sention rather than on fostering confidence. Although the writings
of Coke, Blackstone, and others advanced what may seem totally spu-
rious arguments in support of the privilege,2 modem views generally
point to one of two major policies behind its continued existence:
prevention of dissention between spouses which might result from the
20. See, e.g., 8 WIoMoRE, EViDENCE § 2332 (McNaughten rev. 1961) [herein-
after cited as WiGMoRE]; Louisell, eupra note 19; Comment, The Husband-Wife Priv-
ileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 208, 210 (1961). Cf.
McConacK § 86, at 173.
This is not to say that there are not other, secondary policies behind the com-
munication privilege, similar to those behind the testimonial privilege discussed below.
See text accompanying notes 24-27 and 75-82 infra.
21. The former CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1881 (West 1955), superseded since
1967 by CAL. Evm. CODE § 980, stated in its introductory paragraph:
There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to en-
courage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be
examined as a witness in the following cases: ....
Other states' codifications often contain a similar expression of policy. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (1970).
22. 8 WIGMOBE § 2285, at 527.
23. 8 WIGMORE § 2332. As to the last condition, Wigmore acknowledged the
existence of an argument that the effect of disclosure on the marital relationship
would in fact be minimal or non-existent. [See text accompanying notes 73-121 infra,
for an analysis of this position.] But he also recognized, "Whether this argument is
well founded is not, and probably cannot be, known"; and he considered the other
three conditions "so fully satisfied" that the chance of impairment of the marital rela-
tionship warranted recognition of the privilege. Id. at 642-43.
24. See 8 WIGMoRE H 2227-28. Lord Coke, for example, based the privilege
in part on the unity of husband and wife, whereas Blackstone related it to the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. However, Coke himself also presented the more mod-
em rationale of the preservation of marital harmony. Not all modem writers agree
that the "unity of the spouses" rationale is totally lacking in factual foundation. See,
e.g., Note, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 318, 320 n.19 (1954).
1973] 1359
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testimony of one against the other,25 and society's "natural repug-
nance" at condemning a person on the compelled testimony of his
or her spouse. 26 It is the first of these that the California Law Revi-
sion Commission considered to be the rationale for the privilege in
its state; 27 but both illustrate the public policy unrelated to the
need for full factual investigation which underlies the testimonial
privilege.
In each instance of the creation or continuation of a privilege,
a legislative judgment has been made by the state or other jurisdic-
tion that some social policy (e.g., the right of privacy, marital har-
mony, marital confidence, respect for the judicial system, doctor-
patient confidence. etc.), which it believes is furthered by the privi-
lege, outweighs whatever gain in the adjudicative process that full
disclosure might entail. If the investigation and ascertainment of
truth at the Bar is somewhat curtailed-and not all agree that this
is necessarily the result of nondisclosure 2 8-- then truth and candor
are thought to be increased beyond the courtroom, as in the lawyer's
office or in the home.2 9  The point is not whether an individual
state's legislative judgment is correct, but only that it has been made.
This legislative judgment, and not a desire to "suppress informa-
tion," is the "essential characteristic" of a privilege, and is an expression
by a state of its "deep interest" in the particular policy it seeks to pro-
mote. This is especially so in that the various relationships involved
in the usual privileges-marriage, attorney-client, physician-patient-
are themselves created and regulated by the states; privileges merely
represent one aspect of the overall state interest in these underlying
relationships.30 In effect, then, the Advisory Committee did not re-
25. E.g., 8 WiGMoRE § 2228 at 216-17; Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74,
77-79 (1958).
26. 8 WiGMoRE § 2228, at 217-18; N.Y. TA. LAw. PojnEcr 42; Comment, The
Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 208
(1961).
Both the "dissention" and the "repugnancy" arguments are applicable to the com-
munication privilege as well, although they are advanced less often in that cause.
See text accompanying notes 75-82 infra. It should be noted that Wigmore did not
consider the retention of the marital testimonial privilege to be justified. 8 WloMoan
§ 2228. In this he was not alone. See text accompanying notes 149-51 infra.
27. California Law Rev. Comm'n, Comment to CAL. EviD. CODE § 970 (West
1966).
28. Some maintain, for example, that a privilege promotes truth by preventing the
likelihood of perjured testimony. See Louisell, supra note 19, at 109-10; Comment,
The Husband-Wife Privilege of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 208,
210 (1961).
29. "A decision that privileges foster truth in the doctor's or lawyer's office, and
that such truth is a more desirable goal than truth in the courtroom is better left with
the states." N.Y. TR. LAw. PROJEcr 119. Cf. Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Linita-
tions and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 572-73 (1967).
30. See N.Y. TA. LAw. PROJEcr 33.
1360 [Vol. 61:1353
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ject the "suppression of information," but simply imposed its view
as to what information should be "suppressed" on the states by restricting
privileges in federal courts to those it sanctioned.
Several commentators have attacked the Advisory Committee's
"answers" to the other arguments for state privileges by pointing out,
for example, that even if the protection of confidences is not perfect
(because in some federal cases state privileges would not apply), this
does not justify rendering that protection even less certain or nonexist-
ent.31 If lack of the total protection of federal-state conformity does
render a privilege "illusory," the answer is not to adopt federal rules
which will render state privileges even more illusory, but to adopt
all state privileges in federal courts, thus assuring conformity and
meaningful, non-illusory rules.32 As for the argument that forum-
shopping is a benign process, 33 this presupposes that the Committee's
premise is correct that only "procedure" and not "substantive law" is
at stake-a highly suspect supposition. Unfortunately, the Advisory
Committee's reaction to such criticism was not to change its recom-
mendations as to state privileges, but only to change the language it
used to defend those recommendations. The new language, based
as it is on the same premises, is no more convincing than the old. 4
31. E.g., N.Y. TR. LAw. PROJECT 33; Dunham, supra note 8, at 33; Schwartz,
supra note 1, at 471. The premise that there are already many cases in which federal
courts do not apply state privileges is perhaps less valid in the Ninth Circuit than in
other jurisdictions. See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). See text
accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
32. The Advisory Committee obviously expected that, as often the case with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, state legislatures would ultimately adopt the federal
standards, resulting in federal law uniformity and federal-state conformity. Cf. Ladd,
supra note 8, at 573-74. However, the very first instance of state adoption of the
Proposed Federal Rules should illustrate the futility of this expectation: the State of
Nevada adopted the first draft of the Federal Rules, 46 F.R.D. 161, so that many of
the provisions which on further consideration were changed in the final draft became
frozen in the Nevada statute. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 49.035-49.115 (1971)
(attorney-client privilege). Yet in all their haste, and despite almost verbatim adoption
of privileges such as attorney-client, the Nevada Legislature paid absolutely no heed to
the Advisory Committee's views cutting back marital privilege, newsmen's privilege, or
any other privileges which in their judgment were necessary to effectuate their own
policy decisions. Both the testimonial and communication marital privileges were
adopted in broad form, in addition to comprehensive privileges for physician-patient
(including dentists) and accountant-client communications, and newsmen's sources.
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 49.125-49.275 (1971). The reaction of the states' representatives
in Congress is another indication of this trend, and is apparent throughout the debates
and reports concerning S. 583. Certainly the California Legislature is unlikely at this
stage to abolish either marital privilege or those for physician-patient communications
and newsmen's sources, simply because the Proposed Federal Rules do so. If any-
thing, these privileges, and especially the latter one, have gained more support of late
than ever.
33. Compare the testimony of Judge Friendly, 119 CONG. REc. 5005 (daily ed.
March 19, 1973).
34. A reading of the more lengthy explanation in the final draft of the Rules
HeinOnline  -- 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1361 1973
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II
MARITAL PRIVILEGE-BACKGROUND
A. Common Law Origin
1. The Testimonial Privilege and Spousal Incompetency
There are three aspects to marital privilege, only two of which
demonstrates that although the Committee removed the most offending language, it
did not really alter its views nor its inadequate explanation for its decision. The
Committee still argues in its Note to Rule 501 that the "real impact (of a privilege]
is on the method of proof in the case, and by comparison any substantive aspect ap-
pears tenuous." 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5 at 39 (1973). See text accompanying note 156
infra.
It should be emphasized here that the "substantive" aspect of privileges-their
character as substantive policy decisions of the states-may or may not render them
"substantive" within the meaning of the Erie doctrine (as set forth in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and its progeny). This question has been the subject
of a vast amount of comment, covering the full spectrum of legal opinion. For this
reason, the question will not be examined in detail at this point, except to emphasize
that most authorities have concluded that, at least in diversity cases, Erie compels
application of state-.created privileges, on the theory that they are substantive law.
The Advisory Committee, while acknowledging that "substantial authority" is against
it, finds the question to be one of "choice rather than necessity," and proceeds to
choose to deny state privileges. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FED. R. of
EvD. 501, 34 L. Ed. 2d No. 5 at 39 (1973). The Advisory Committee bases its
reasoning on Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). However, Hanna concerned
what the Court termed "housekeeping rules" for federal courts, specifically the pro-
cedure for service of process. Therefore the Hanna reasoning may not be applicable
to privileges. "It is no longer the federal courthouse that is being kept when a federal
rule obliterates state created privileges especially in cases arising under state law."
N.Y. TR. IAw. P oJEcr 32. See also WRGH1T & MMILER, § 2408. Interestingly
enough, Professor Wright would insist that state rules of privilege be followed in state
law cases simply because he believes the Rules are procedural under Hanna, as it
would be "quite indefensible" to allow a federal procedural rule to defeat a substan-
tive state policy; supra note 29, at 573. Contra, Green, supra note 8, at 10; Ladd,
supra note 8, at 570.
A few of the analyses of the Erie problem with respect to privileges are listed be-
low. While these writers differ on whether Erie compels recognition of state privi-
leges in state-law cases, all but Ladd and Green conclude that such recognition is ei-
ther necessary or desirable for policy reasons. Degnan, supra note 8, at 299-301;
Dunham, supra note 8; Green, supra note 8; Korn, Second Circuit Conference, 48
F.R.D. at 65-77; Ladd, supra note 8, at 559-74; Louisell, supra note 19; McNichols,
supra note 8, at 192-93; Pugh, Rule 43(a) and the Communication Privileged Under State
Law, 7 VAND. L. Rlv. 556, 567-70 (1954); Weinstein, supra note 8; Wright, supra
note 29; Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 CAL'. L. REv.
640 (1964); Comment, Privilege in Federal Diversity Cases, 10 NAT. REs. J. 861
(1970); Note, 44 CALIw. L. REV. 949 (1956). See also N.Y. Th. LAw. PRoJECT
30-32. But cf. Ladd, supra note 10, at 714.
Whether the Committee's position as to Erie is correct is a battle to be fought on
another ground. Further discussion of Erie in relation to the marital privilege in fed-
eral courts can be found in the text accompanying notes 67-71 and 154-58 infra.
For the purposes of the remaining discussion, I will assume that the matter is indeed
one of choice, and will concentrate on the question of the wisdom of the choice made
by the Advisory Committee in dealing with the marital privilege.
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are properly denominated "privileges" and survive as such today.
The privilege not to testify against one's spouse (or to prevent ad-
verse testimony by a spouse) probably antedated by at least half a cen-
tury the more sweeping incompetency of a witness spouse to testify
at all, for or against his or her partner.35 Although the two con-
cepts are often combined or confused, they are, in fact, different in
both policy and effect.3 6 Under the marital disqualification, as in
any rule of incompetency, testimony was not a matter of choice by
either witness or party spouse; it was simply forbidden, as would be
that of a person incapable of expressing himself or of understanding
the duty to tell the truth.37  The testimonial privilege, on the other hand,
which first appeared in 1580,38 could be waived by the party spouse and
was subject to certain exceptions, primarily in criminal prosecutions for
a crime against the spouse.3 9
The rationale for the testimonial privilege has been discussed;40
that for incompetency was similar. To the extent that it prevented testi-
mony for the spouse, husband and wife were seen as "one being;" 41 since
their interests were one, a spouse, like the litigant himself, was not suffi-
ciently impartial to testify.42 To the extent the disqualification extended
to adverse testimony, the rationale was the danger to marital harmony
which such testimony would create.43
Today the incompetency of spouses has generally been abolished
in common law jurisdictions, including the United States,44 and with
a few exceptions only the privilege with respect to testimony against
35. 8 WiGMoRE § 2227. Wigmore refers to the testimonial privilege as the
"anti-marital" privilege, or privilege for anti-marital facts, probably to emphasize the
"against" aspect so often misunderstood.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 701 (West 1966).
38. Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
39. E.g., Lord Audley's Case, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140 (C.P. 1631), 3 How. St. Tr.
401, 402, 414 (1631); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMmNAmREs *443. Although Wigmore
separates the incompetency to testify for a spouse from the privilege not to testify
against a spouse, it is unclear whether the latter might not in fact have been an abso-
lute disqualification as well. See Shenton v. Tyler [1939] 1 Ch. 620 (C.A.); Comment,
Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California, 19 CALn. L. REv. 390 (1931);
Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where
the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38
VA. L. REV. 359, 360 (1952).
40. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
41. "For they are two souls in one flesh" ("quia sunt duae animae in came
una"). CoxE, CommENTARY UPON LrrrLETON 6b (1628).
42. 1 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *443. This was also sometimes charac-
terized as a bias of affection. 2 WiMoDE § 601.
43. E.g., Stapleton v. Crofts, 118 Eng. Rep. 137, 138 (Q.B. 1852); 2 KENT,
COMxENTAity *180.
44. See 2 WiMoRE § 602.
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a spouse remains.45
2. The Communication Privilege
The privilege not to disclose (or to prevent disclosure of) con-
fidential marital communications is more obscure in its origins than
the testimonial privilege. Wigmore 8 believed the privilege was recog-
nized as early as 1684, although it was not explicitly stated until the
Evidence Amendment Act of 1853; other authorities, however, includ-
ing the English Court of Appeal, have denied the existence of any
common law origin of the privilege.47  Wigmore offers as a probable
explanation for this confusion the great extent to which the commu-
nication privilege overlaps the testimonial privilege and spousal incom-
petency, so that--especially when incompetency still prevailed-it
was seldom necessary to invoke the communication privilege. 4a To-
day, however, there are many instances in which the communication
privilege would be applicable but the testimonial privilege would not,
as when neither spouse is a party to the proceeding, or when the
marriage has ended at the time of trial, or when a third person has
intercepted the communication.
B. California Origins
1. The Testimonial Privilege and Spousal Incompetency 49
In 1851 California codified the common law incompetency of
45. 8 WIGMORE § 2245. See the discussion in Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958). Many of the statutory reforms are set out in Note, The
Marital "For and Against" Privilege in California, 8 STAN. L. REV. 420, 423-25 (1956).
46. 8 WIGMORE § 2333.
47. Shenton v. Tyler [1939] 1 Ch. 620 (C.A.). The court recognized but did
not follow contrary authority including Wigmore.
In Great Britain this provision of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1853 was abol-
ished for civil proceedings by passage of the Civil Evidence Act of 1968, whereby com-
munication privilege was left to the discretion of the judge, a not uncommon approach
in England. An apt criticism is found in 31 MOD. L. REv. 668, 672-73 (1968):
The exercise of a judicial discretion in this area may well prove a satis-
factory solution though some may feel that retention of the privilege would
accord more with contemporary social ethics and would represent what most
spouses would imagine to be the legal position in communicating to his or
her spouse.
It appears that the British criminal law may follow the same course, if somewhat re-
luctantly. See CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT, Cmnd. 4991,
at 106 (1972).
Both the civil and criminal law reforms maintain or strengthen the testimonial
privilege. Id. at 92-98; Civil Evidence Act 1968 § 14(1) (b) (privilege against self-
incrimination includes incrimination of spouse).
48. 8 WIGMORE § 2333.
49. See generally, e.g., CALIFORNIA LAw REVISION COMM'N, REcOMMENDATION
AND STUDY RELATING TO THE MARITAL "Fop, AND AGAINST" TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE, I
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spouses to testify for or against each other.5 The incompetency was
removed by statute in 1863;"1 although this enactment was subse-
quently held inapplicable to criminal proceedings, 2 in 1866 spouses
were made competent "for or against" each other in criminal actions
if both consented or in cases of personal violence by one against the
other.5 Thus, contrary to the common law sequence, what began
as an incompetency became a privilege held by both spouses.
The codifications of 1872 enacted the testimonial privilege for
both civil54 and criminal55 actions, and as to testimony both for
and against a spouse. The civil privilege was held by the party
spouse; the criminal privilege by both. These were superseded by
the 1965 enactment of California's Evidence Code, one of the few
successful attempts to date at complete codification of the law of evi-
dence. 6 Section 970 thereof states:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a married person has a privi-
lege not to testify against his spouse in any proceedingyt
Several significant changes in the privilege were made by the new
code. The privilege is now held by the witness spouse only, and
applies only to testimony against the other. Additionally, by section
971, a person may refuse even to be called as a witness in any pro-
CAL. LAW REV. COaM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATION AND STuDIEs F-i, F-10 & F-11
(1957) [hereinafter cited as CAL. LAW REV. COMM'N STUDY]; Comment, Privileged
Testimony of Husband and Wife in California, 19 CALiF. L. REV. 390, 391-92 (1931);
Note, The Marital "For and Against" Privilege in California, 8 STAN. L. REV. 420,
426-27 (1956).
50. Ch. 5, § 395 [1851] Cal. Stats. 114. The statute contained the common law
"necessity" exception for actions between spouses. In Dawley v. Ayers, 23 Cal. 108
(1863), it was held that an 1861 enactment allowing all parties to an action to testify
(ch. 467, § 1, [1861] Cal. Stats. 521) did not remove this incompetency.
51. Ch. 528, § 1 [1863] Cal. Stats. 771. Divorce actions were not included
until 1870, and even then corroboration was required. Ch. 188, § 2, [1869-70] Cal.
Stats. 291.
52. People v. McFlynn, 1 Cal. Unrep. 234 (1865).
53. Ch. 64, § 1 [1865-66] Cal. Stats. 46.
54. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1881(1) (repealed 1967). An exception was
made for civil actions between spouses. Further exceptions were added by amend-
ment in 1907 and 1933.
55. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1322 (repealed 1965). An exception was made for
crimes by one spouse against the other, and other exceptions were added in subsequent
years.
56. The influence of the California Evidence Code is apparent, and often spe-
cifically acknowledged, throughout the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. It is un-
fortunate no such example was taken with respect to marital privilege.
57. CAL. Evw. CODE § 970 (West 1966). A definitional equivalence of mascu-
line and feminine terminology [CAL. EvID. CODE § 9] obviates the need to repeat, as
did prior codifications, each provision in terms of "husband" and of "wife." Note,
however, that commentators almost invariably equate "witness" with "wife" and "ac-
cused" (or "party") with "husband," perhaps more from convenience or experience
than chivalry.
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ceeding in which his or her spouse is a party.58  Subsequent sec-
tions contain various exceptions59 and provisions for waiver. 00
2. The Communication Privilege
The same statute which abolished the testimonial incompetency
of spouses in 1863 retained the absolute disqualification as to marital
communications."1 This became a privilege by the codifications of
1872,6 applicable to both civil and criminal actions.03  The privilege
was apparently held by only the non-witness spouse, although this
is not entirely clear. 64
When the California Evidence Code was enacted, the communi-
cation privilege was adopted as section 980:
Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in
this article, a spouse (or his guardian or conservator when he has
a guardian or conservator), whether or not a party, has a privi-
lege during the marital relationship and afterwards to refuse to dis-
close, and to prevent another from disclosing, a communication
if he claims the privilege and the communication was made in confi-
dence between him and the other spouse while they were husband
and wife.
Again several significant changes were made. Principally, the
privilege is given to both spouses, and it is made applicable to third
persons, such as eavesdroppers and those to whom, the non-claim-
ant spouse might have disclosed the communication. Previously, nei-
ther such person could be prevented from testifying as to the content
of the communication."5 Although the Evidence Code, unlike the
prior statute, specifically requires that the communication be made
"in confidence," a statutory presumption of confidentiality applicable
to all communication privileges60 makes satisfaction of this requirement
relatively easy.
58. CAL. Evm. CODE § 971 (West 1966). This section is analogous to the privi-
lege of a criminal defendant to refuse to be called as a witness [CAL. EviD. CoDE
§ 930], and, like that provision, is intended to avoid the prejudicial effect of an objec-
tion to testimony made in open court. Note that this privilege applies only where the
spouse is a party, whereas the general testimonial privilege applies to adverse testimony
in any proceeding.
59. CAL. EviD. CODE § 972 (West 1966).
60. CAL. EviD. CODE § 973 (West 1966).
61. Ch. 528, § 1, [1863] Cal. Stats. 771.
62. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC.§ 1881(1) (repealed 1967).
63. See People v. Mullings, 83 Cal. 138, 23 P. 229 (1890).
64. See Calif. Law Rev. Comm'n, Comment to CAL. Evm. CoDE § 980 (West
1966).
65. Id. See Comment, Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California,
19 CALim. L. REv. 390, 404 (1931). Under prior law the disclosure by one spouse
was a waiver as to both.
66. CAL. EviD. CODE § 917 (West 1966).
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C. . Marital Privilege in Federal Court
As noted earlier, there is still controversy over whether rules of privi-
lege are substantive or procedural for Erie purposes, and whether they
are applicable in diversity and other state-law federal proceedings; most
courts and commentators agree that they are substantive under Erie."'
In federal question cases, a majority of federal courts holds that state
privilege law does not apply.68 In fact, the refusal of federal courts
to recognize state privileges in federal criminal prosecutions led to
one of thd Advisory Committee's chief arguments against retaining
state privileges-what is already partially eroded is too "illusory" to
be worth preserving.6 9 However, whatever the validity of this ration-
ale in other jurisdictions or with regard to other privileges, it is less
than convincing as applied to California and to the marital privilege.
The Ninth Circuit apparently has not accepted the conventional wis-
dom with respect to Erie, and has indicated that so strong are the
substantive policies behind state-created privileges, their application is
"required" even in federal question cases.7  Furthermore, even in
cases in which federal courts purport to apply federal privilege rules
in federal question litigation, they generally recognize a comprehen-
sive federal marital privilege.71 Thus the effect of excluding the greater
67. E.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1967); Krizak v. W.C. Brooks & Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37, 43 (4th Cir. 1963);
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1962); Baird v.
Koemer, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956); Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.
Miss. 1970); Berdon v. McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
See also authorities cited in note 34 supra.
68. E.g., Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934); Garner v. Wolfinbarger,
430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) and cases cited therein; Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1962); United States v.
Brunner, 200 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1952). But cf. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623
(9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 212 F. Supp. 92 (D.NJ.
1962).
Note that in the great majority of these cases the federal government is a party, a
situation in which there is the strongest argument for application of a federal standard.
By no means all "federal question" cases fall into this category.
69. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FED. R. Evm. 501, 34 L. Ed. 2d,
No. 5 at 39 (1973). See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
70. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (income tax violation).
The Circuit's position on criminal cases is unsettled. See United States v. Friedman,
445 F.2d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971).
71. E.g., United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971); Peek
v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Walker, 176
F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949).
See generally, N.Y. Ta. LAw. PRomEcr 36; Weinstein, supra note 8, at 372 & n.82;
Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 640, 649-56
(1964); Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal
Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern
Trend, 38 VA. L. REv. 359 (1952).
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part of California's marital privilege from federal proceedings is far
more than "illusory." It is, in fact, a significant dilution of the effective-
ness of the privilege in achieving whatever polices the California legis-
lature intended when enacting and re-enacting it.
This dilution of state policy is heightened because privileges, as
distinguished from other evidentiary rules, are meant primarily to af-
fect and protect out-of-court conduct unrelated to litigation. To broad-
en that protection, privileges are expressly made applicable to any
proceeding-whether before a court, a grand jury, an administrative
body, or any other person or tribunal before whom testimony can be
compelled, even if other rules of evidence are specifically rendered
inapplicable thereto.7 2  The policy of encouraging free and unfettered
communication between spouses (or between attorney and client,
doctor and patient, and so forth) would indeed be somewhat "illu-
sory" if the privilege protected only against disclosure in formal court
proceedings-there being so many other tribunals before which the
communicants might in the future appear or their confidences might
be in issue. The more tribunals there are which deny the privilege,
the weaker its assurance of future protection. Thus the sudden re-
moval of the entire federal system from those protected forums, where
before most and arguably all federal proceedings were included, can-
not help but adversely affect-if not wholly defeat-the intent of and
the policy behind the marital privilege in California.
I
MARITAL PRIVILEGE UNDER THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULES
Marital privilege does not fare well under the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence; in fact, all that remains is a watered-down version
of the testimonial privilege. I have already discussed the Advisory
Committee's general approach toward state-created privileges and its
effect on the decision whether to adopt or reject certain of those privi-
leges. In the remaining sections I shall deal specifically with the
Advisory Committee's recommendations regarding marital privilege and
-to the extent they are expressed-its reasons therefor. In the
course of and following that examination, I will attempt to respond to
those reasons and put forward my own view as to how the Rules
should treat marital privilege-and to some extent, by analogy,
all privileges.
72. See, e.g., CAL. Evw. CODE §§ 900-01, 910 (West 1966); PROPOsED FED.
R. Evw. 1101, 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5 at 132 (1973).
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A. The Advisory Committee and Martial Communications
As indicated earlier, 73 the marital communication privilege ade-
quately meets Wigmore's four criteria, at least in the view of Dean
Wigmore himself and many state legislatures. Nevertheless, the Ad-
visory Committee rejects the communication privilege with a five-
sentence "explanation" and the citation of a single direct authority.
After setting out the Advisory Committee's rationale verbatim, I will
analyze in some detail both that rationale and its supposed authority.
While the arguments respecting state-created privileges in general
provide a defense for retention of the marital communication privi-
lege, here we encounter and must respond to the specific attack on
that privilege which apparently convinced the Advisory Committee
to abolish it entirely.
The Advisory Committee's Note respecting marital communication
privilege is as follows:
[Rule 505] recognizes no privilege for confidential communi-
cations. The traditional justifications for privileges not to testify
against a spouse and not to be testified against by one's spouse have
been the prevention of marital dissension and the repugnancy of
requiring a person to condemn or be condemned by his spouse.
8 Wigmore §§ 2228, 2241 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). These con-
siderations bear no relevancy to marital communications. Nor
can it be assumed that marital conduct will be affected by a privi-
lege for confidential communications of whose existence the par-
ties in all likelihood are unaware. The other communication privi-
leges, by way of contrast, have as one party a professional person
who can be expected to inform the other of the existence of the
privilege. Moreover, the relationships from which those privileges
arise are essentially and almost exclusively verbal in nature, quite
unlike marriage. See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations
on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675
(1929). Cf. McCormick § 90; 8 Wigmore § 2337 (McNaughtonRev. 1961). 74
Let us take each argument in turn, although not necessarilty in order
of importance.
1. "Dissension" and "Repugnancy"
It is true that the traditional rationale for the communication
privilege has not been "the prevention of marital dissension and the
repugnancy of requiring a person to condemn or be condemned by
73. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
74. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FFD. R. Evm. 505, 34 L. Ed. 2d,
No. 5 at 49-50 (1973).
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his spouse"--at least not in those terms. However, to state flatly
that "these considerations bear no relevancy to marital communica-
tions" is simply not a realistic view of the privilege. As discussed
previously, the traditional rationale for the communication privilege
has been the protection and encouragement of marital confidences
and of the marital relationship itself,75 whereas "prevention of dissen-
sion" and "repugnancy" have generally been given as the rationale for
the testimonial privilege.76 Yet one easily can argue that these latter
factors are even more relevant to marital communications than to the
general testimonial privilege.
McCormick, in deprecating the encouragement-of-confidences ra-
tionale for the communication privilege, concludes that the "real
source" of the privilege is the "feeling of indelicacy and want of decor-
um in prying into the secrets of husband and wife."77  While this
conclusion may or may not be accurate, it is less a condemnation than
a strong argument in support of the privilege, although it might not
have seemed so in 1954 when Professor McCormick first penned his
remarks. Surely the compelled revelation of confidences entrusted
in the privacy of the marital relationship would be just as "repugnant"
to the public and the judiciary and would create at least as much
"dissension" in the home as would any other adverse spousal testi-
mony covered by the testimonial privilege. And it is scarcely more
"delicate" to convict a defendant on the basis of intimate marital com-
munications where those communications are revealed by an eaves-
dropper-a practice which Rule 505 does not protect against and
may in fact encourage-than where they are revealed by the spouse.
Moreover, as illustrated by cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut78
and Parrish v. Civil Service Commission,9 there is more than just senti-
ment to the repugnance we feel at prying into marital confidences.
What is at stake is no less than a right to privacy in that area of
life in which privacy is most cherished and to which privacy is per-
haps most important.80 What a man says to his wife, what secrets
75. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
77. McCoimncK § 86, at 173.
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Several aspects of the case are discussed in Sym-
posium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MxcH. L. REv. 197-288
(1965).
79. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967). Parrish concerned
"midnight raids" on recipients of welfare aid to determine whether mothers of depen-
dent children were living with "unauthorized males." The California Supreme Court
upheld a case worker's right to refuse to participate in such raids and declared them
unconstitutional, noting the similarity to the invasion of marital privacy in Griswold.
80. See N.Y. TA. LAw. PRoJEcT 42; Louisell, supra note 19, at 110. Cf. North
v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972), in which
the court cited California's marital communication privilege as demonstrating a legis-
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he reveals and what hopes and fears he expresses, are simply not
society's concern. Not only is "utter freedom of marital communica-
tion from all government supervision, constraint, control or observa-
tion" a "psychological necessity" to successful marriage;81 it is a funda-
mental human right, the impairment of which a social order based on
the family unit should not and will not lightly countenance.8 2
2. Lack of Awareness
The next, and perhaps most persistent, argument voiced by the
Advisory Committee against the communication privilege is that mari-
tal conduct (and in particular marital communication) is not affected
by the absence of a privilege because "in all likelihood" the parties
to the communication are "unaware" of the privilege's existence. I
will analyze this argument in some detail because it has been a pri-
mary basis for condemnation of the marital communication privilege,
and a continuing source of comfort for its critics, ever since the argu-
ment was advanced, apparently for the first time, in 1929.3 Having
been accepted for half a century, this premise is badly in need of a
thorough airing and examination. Furthermore, I contend that wheth-
er this premise is true or false, it is an insufficient reason for abolition
of the communication privilege.
It is logical, at least, to contend that if the existence of a privi-
lege to prevent disclosure of marital communications is primarily jus-
tified as fostering the freedom of such communications unfettered by
fear of later revelation, then the absence of any awareness of the exist-
ence of the privilege by those it is intended to protect will tend to
negate the privilege's utility.84 Thus the Advisory Committee seems
lative intention to include such communications within those requiring special protec-
tion against invasions of privacy (in the context of an overheard prison conversation).
81. Louisell, supra note 19, at 113. The full quotation is set out in the text
accompanying note 120 infra. Cf. Comment, The Husband-Wife Privilege of Testi-
monial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. RPv. 208, 218, 231 (1961). Compare the per-
sonal observations of attorney David Berger and the remarks of Professor Charles
Black during the Second Circuit Judicial Conference, 48 F.R.D. 39, 48-49, 51 (1969).
82. The value and necessity of complete confidence, candor, and freedom in
marital communications, even were there no scientific authority to support it, would be
obvious to any married person. Yet many scientific studies are available to confirm
this common observation, should it be considered open to doubt. See, e.g., Folsom,
Communication in Marriage and Marriage Counseling, 20 MAnn. & FAm. Liv. 113
(1958); Harper, Communication Problems in Marriage and Marriage Counseling, 20
MARm. & FAM. Liv. 107 (1958); (discussing in particular "safety of expression");
Hobard & Klausner, Some Social Interactional Correlates of Marital Role Disagree-
ment and Marital Adjustment, 21 MAim. & FAm. LIv. 256 (1959); Navran, Communi-
cation and Adjustment in Marriage, 6 FAmY PRocEss 173 (1967).
83. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family
Relations, 13 MNm. L. Rv. 675 (1929).
84. As will be seen below, however (see text accompanying notes 114-18 infral,
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to raise a legitimate issue when it considers whether anyone really
knows that a marital privilege exists. Unfortunately, like so many oth-
er commentators, the Committee accepts an "easy" answer to the ques-
tion with far too little critical consideration.
a. The Hutchins & Slesinger Premise
The sole direct authority cited by the Advisory Committee for
its conclusion that the marital privilege exists in a vacuum of igno-
rance is an article written in 1929 by Dean Robert Hutchins and Don-
ald Slesinger.85  Hutchins and Slesinger discuss several serious defi-
ciencies in then (1929) contemporary concepts of marital privilege.
The majority of criticisms raised by the authors, such as the problem
of what constitutes a "communication," or what to do about the
eavesdropper, while legitimate in their day and still so in some juris-
dictions, have since been corrected (if they ever existed) by at least
the more recent legislative or judicial revisions of the law of privilege,
and in particular by the California Evidence Code.80  In addition,
the authors' feeling that marital privilege is an ineffective attempt
to "stem the tide" of the modem breakdown of the family unit 7 is
refuted best by their own admission that the high rate of divorce, the
low birth rate, and the loss of intrafamily economic dependence may
actually indicate a greater-than-ever emphasis on spousal intimacy
and compatibility.8  If the authors are correct that the "only re-
maining binding ties are sexual and affectional,"89 it follows that
now more than ever we must respect and preserve the privacy and
intimacy which are at the heart of those ties.90
ignorance of the privilege's existence may make for much freer communication than
would knowledge of its nonexistence.
It is interesting that in many other areas of the law, we presume knowledge and
judge actions accordingly. Thus a criminal offender is presumed to know the criminal
law, and a hearsay declarant is often presumed to know that a statement is against his
proprietary, pecuniary, or legal interests; and where knowledge can neither be pre-
sumed nor demonstrated, rights generally cannot be waived or lost.
85. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 83.
86. See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
87. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 83, at 677-79.
88. Id. at 679-80. Cf. Louisell, supra note 19, at 123 n.103.
89. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 83, at 677-79.
90. See authorities cited in note 82 supra. Hutchins and Slesinger also state
that there is a "growing tendency toward revelation of intimacies where the end in
view seems to justify it." Id. at 682. However, the instances which they cite-
revelation to a psychiatrist, or to scientific researchers-are examples of voluntary dis-
closure at the free option of the person involved. This is certainly no argument for
compulsory revelation in a courtroom, any more than the fact that some married
couples choose to reveal their most intimate secrets to the reading public or to re-
searchers like Masters and Johnson is any indication that the public in general no
longer considers such details of married life private or in need of protection.
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One of the many arguments advanced by Hutchins and Slesing-
er, however, has outlived all the others:
Very few people ever get into court,91 and practically no one out-
side the legal profession knows anything about the rules regarding
privileged communications between the spouses.92
Significantly, the authors cite no authority whatsoever for this declara-
tion of fact. Those who have in later years repeated this proposition
have cited either the quotation just set out,93 nothing at all, 4 or,
in the best tradition of a self-perpetuating proposition the commen-
tators eventually began to cite each other.95 Thus an impressive-ap-
pearing body of authority was created from whole cloth, as it were, with
little or no support.
Having concluded that people are unaware of the privilege, Hut-
chins and Slesinger seem then to assert that awareness itself is not
significant:
As far as the writers are aware (though research might lead to
another conclusion) marital harmony among lawyers who know
about privileged communications is not vastly superior to that of
other professional groups.90
Whether or not "research might lead to another conclusion," marital har-
mony among attorneys is probably irrelevant, since many factors peculiar
91. The authors note [at note 39] that recent unpublished research had re-
vealed that "almost two-thirds of the cases put on the court calendar are withdrawn or
discontinued before reaching judgment." However, as will be seen, such a statistic
has no bearing on the effect of the privilege.
92. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 83, at 682 [emphasis added].
93. E.g., Wright, supra note 29, at 573; Comment, Marital Privilege and the
Right to Testify, 34 U. CmI. L. REv. 196, 200 (1966).
94. E.g., Comment, Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California,
19 CALp. L. Rnv. 390, 413 (1931).
95. Perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon is the following se-
quence: Hutchins & Slesinger cited no authority; the student author of the Comment
noted supra note 94 likewise cited no authority; McCormick, in his original edition, cited
these latter two authorities (McCoRMacK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVmENCE § 90
nn. 1 & 2 (1st ed. 1954)); the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 505, supra note 74,
cited Hutchins & Slesinger (with a "cf ' to the original edition of McCormick);
and now the 1972 edition of McCormick, supra note 19, at § 86, comes full circle and
cites and quotes from the Advisory Committee Note which, of course, cites Hutchins
& Slesinger. Similarly, Professor Green, supra note 8, at 11, cites Professor Wright
and Hutchins & Slesinger; whereas Professor Wright, supra note 29, at 573, merely
cites the latter. See also Comment, Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privileges: The Power
of the Federal Courts to Seek a Rational Solution, 17 ST. L.U.L.J. 107, 122 (1972).
For his part, Professor Wright states, "Of course there is very little evidence that
people consult the local law of privilege before making, or refraining from making,
confidential communications. Indeed such evidence as exists [Hutchins & Slesinger]
indicates that they do not." Wright, supra note 29, at 573 [emphasis added]. If this
is "evidence," it can only be classified as nonexpert opinion lacking sufficient founda-
tion for admission.
96. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 83, at 682.
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to that profession may contribute to marital strain not experienced by
other professionals. Nevertheless, I suspect that such research would
indicate greater freedom of communication to spouses, physicians, and
others in protected relationships by those cognizant of the relevant privi-
leges. If awareness of a privilege has, in fact, no effect on freedom of
communication, then no communication privilege can be justified, in-
cluding attorney-client, because all are based on the opposite premise.97
And if the authors meant to say that privacy and freedom of communi-
cation have no effect on marital harmony, I simply reject their conclu-
sion for reasons stated elsewhere.98
b. The Validity of the "Awareness" Premise
While research on the marital harmony of attorneys would be of
doubtful value, what would be useful is meaningful research on the actual
degree to which persons unschooled in the law are aware that some form
of marital privilege exists. 99 I would be greatly surprised if such aware-
ness were not more extensive than many critics have assumed. Per-
haps we were not so litigious a people in 1929 as we are today;
in 1972, over thirteen million lawsuits were filed in California state
courts alone. 00 This figure does not include the vast number of per-
sons who appear in some capacity each year before administrative
agencies, grand juries, and other tribunals, or the countless others who
anticipate litigation which does not materialize. In addition, the media,
especially television, lead to increased public awareness of legal concepts
such as privileges. Never have so many persons been so cognizant of,
and so ready to assert, their right to a "day in court," and increasing
awareness most certainly has its effect on their conduct with respect to
potentially litigious situations. No one contends that all persons are
aware of their evidentiary privileges, any more than all are aware of their
civil rights; nor would all alter their conduct in accordance with such
awareness. But it should be sufficient that a substantial number fall
within the areas of awareness and effect contemplated by the marital
communication privilege. 10
97. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
98. See note 82 supra and text accompanying note 120 infra.
99. Professor Louisell has also expressed a desire for further research in the
area of marital privilege. Louisell, supra note 19, at 101.
100. [1973] JuDIciAL CoUNcIL OF CALnwoRNL, ANN. REP., pt. 2, ANNUAL REPORT
oF Tim ADmNiSTRATvE OFFICE OF THE CALiFoRNA CouRTs, Pt. II, at 187, 219, 229
(1973). The statistics are for the fiscal year 1971-72 and represent a 56 per cent
increase over 1961-62.
101. It should be kept in mind that, although the existence or nonexistence of a
communication privilege affects the lives and actions of those who never enter a court-
room as well as those who do, the latter category is far greater in number than the total
of civil litigants and criminal defendants. Privileges protect not only parties to a pro-
ceeding, but also witnesses totally removed from any interest in the outcome, and even
[Vol. 61:13531374
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It is noteworthy that no other conduct-oriented right or exclu-
sionary rule seems to elicit such skepticism as to the public's aware-
ness. One of our most precious rights is the right of privacy. Wheth-
er or not the privacy of marital communications is protected under
the same penumbra of constititional imperatives as the privacy of
birth control decisions,l °2 we do not measure thd existence of that
right of privacy by the number of persons who are aware of its legal
ramifications. Yet one important reason for enforcing the right
of privacy is to encourage freedom of thought and communication. 103
In addition, there are numerous other evidentiary rules, not usually
classified as "privileges," which take for granted some form of knowl-
edge on the part of those whose conduct is supposedly governed by
their existence, such as the rules regarding evidence of post-accident
repairs,104 gratuitous offers of aid (the "Good Samaritan" prob-
lem), 1°1 and offers of compromise, 10 6 all of which withhold arguably
relevant evidence of conduct in order not to discourage such conduct
by others.' 0 7
One can readily suppose that as many married couples are
aware that they have a marital privilege as know of the privileges for
communications to psychotherapists and clergymen, both of which
are retained in full by the Proposed Rules.' 08 The Advisory Com-
mittee justifies its abolition of the marital privilege in part by compar-
ing it to these "other communication privileges" which "have as one
those who, although not themselves witnesses, wish to protect a confidential com-
munication to or from a witness. We are thus speaking of a large number of "di-
rectly" involved individuals. That few cases reach judgment-as pointed out by
Hutchins & Slesinger-is irrelevant.
102. See, e.g. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
103. See King, Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitu-
tional Consideration, 66 Dcx. L. Rv. 17 (1961). Cf. Comment, The Constitutional
Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L. J. 1084
(1961).
104. See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 1151 (West 1966).
105. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1152 (West 1966).
106. See, e.g., Id.
107. Of course, this evidence might sometimes be considered irrelevant: for ex-
ample, by the time post-accident repairs are made circumstances have changed re-
specting reasonable notice of the condition. Nevertheless, the usual rationale for such
rules is the public policy against discouraging such conduct. See, e.g., Westbrooks v.
Gordon H. Ball, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 209, 56 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1967); Oldenberg v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 733, 314 P.2d 33 (1957); McCoRMIcK § 74.
McCormick argued that some of these rules should properly be classified as privileges.
McConmcnK §§ 74-78 (1st ed. 1954). His successors did not agree. Id. § 74
(2d ed. 1972).
108. Proposed FED. R. EviD. 504, 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5 at 45 (1973) (psychothera-
pist-patient privilege); Proposed FED. R. EviD. 506, 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5 at 50 (1973)
(communications to clergymen).
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party a professional person who can be expected to inform the other
of the existence of the privilege."'1 9  But how many clergymen or
psychotherapists know about their particular privilege; and of those
who know, how many actually inform their communicants of its exist-
ence unless specifically asked?1 0 Surely we cannot say there is a
sufficient difference in "awareness" between these and the marital
communication privilege to draw a rigid line that accepts one totally
and abolishes the other out of hand."'
Perhaps one explanation for this seeming inconsistency is that,
at least with respect to the clergyman's privilege, the Advisory Com-
mittee succumbed to that which it dismissed in relation to marital
privilege: a regard for the "indelicacy" or "unseemliness" of com-
pelling a priest, minister or rabbi to reveal a confession made to him
by one who trusted in his discretion.112
c. Accepting the "Unawareness" Premise
I have indicated some reasons why I disagree with the Advisory
Committee's acceptance of the premise that married persons are un-
likely to be aware of the communication privilege. Even if we as-
sume for sake of argument that this premise is correct, it still does
not in any way warrant abolition of the privilege in federal courts.
L Litigation-Connected Effects. Whatever the effect lack of
awareness might have on the rationale that the communication privilege
encourages confidence and freedom of expression, it has no effect what-
soever on the efficacy of the privilege in actually preventing disclosure
of marital confidences in court, and thereby (1) preventing dissension
in the particular marriage concerned; (2) avoiding the unseemly spec-
tre of trial by invasion of privacy; and (3) eliminating a deterrent to free
communcation by others in the future-all secondary but vital policies
behind the privilege." 13
109. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FrD. R. EviD. 505, 34 L. Ed. 2d,
No. 5 at 49 (1973) [emphasis added].
110. I omit here the question of awareness by attorneys of the attorney-client
privilege. There are no doubt many attorneys who, although they remember to assert
the privilege at trial or discovery, neglect to inform their clients of it in advance, and
thus lose some degree of candor they might otherwise expect.
111. The Advisory Committee is not helpful in explaining its decision. The Note
to Rule 506 declares, "The considerations which dictate the recognition of privileges
generally seem strongly to favor a privilege for confidential communications to
clergymen." 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5 at 51 (1973). I do not disagree with this conclusion
in the least, but it applies equally well to the marital communication privilege.
112. This would not be a novel situation. The Irish courts were enforcing a
sacerdotal privilege when the English courts were not, and not because Irish citizens
were necessarily more knowledgeable in the law than the English. See Cook v.
Carroll [1945] I. R. 515.
113. One writer takes the argument a step further by suggesting that jurors will
turn against such testimony and against the party who introduces it, and the public
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ii. Informing the People. If, in fact, people generally are ignor-
ant of those rights and privileges which have the potential to affect their
personal lives and everyday activities, the legal community could attempt
to inform them instead of simply taking those privileges away. This
is, of course, only one aspect of a general failing of our educational sys-
tem and the organized Bar adequately to inform and educate members
of the public as to the laws under which they live, with the result that
people may be punished for infractions of laws of which they are only
vaguely aware, and many more never enjoy the benefits of rights and
privileges of which they are unaware. Many Bar and lay groups are now
attempting to create increased awareness in people of their rights and
duties; it is not far-fetched to suggest that such education include
the fundamentals of evidentiary privileges-marital, medical, sacer-
dotal, and attorney-client.
iii. Awareness by the Litigant. Again assuming that the average
person is unaware of the existence of a marital communication privilege,
what of litigants who, upon first becoming involved in a lawsuit or
criminal proceeding, consult their attorneys as to their rights and legal
position? Very likely they will learn of their privileges as well, and
from then on (for what could be a matter of months or years in some
cases) they will be fully aware of whether they can speak freely before
their attorneys, their spouses, or any other individuals. Thus for those
who do get to the courtroom, any ignorance of the law of privilege may
be a temporary state of mind. While the marital privilege was not
created only for the litigants of the world, they are the ones who en-
counter it in its most stark and meaningful terms.
iv. If We Didn't Know It Existed, We Will Surely Know It's Gone.
The marital privilege is, like all privileges, a negative concept
which prevents revelation of certain information (even in the sanctity
of the judge's chambers) ,114 and so prevents the issue of its existence
or nonexistence from coming to public attention.11 5 If in fact the
privilege or its application remains somewhat obscure, perhaps it is
because it has commanded little public notice and created little con-
sternation until now.'1 6 However, once the privilege is abolished this
may well change. The publicity attending the present Congressional de-
bates has already greatly increased public awareness of evidentiary privi-
leges; and the news of their ultimate abolition would not remain a sec-
may ultimately turn against a judicial system that permits it. Comment, The Husband-
Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. Rav. 208, 231 (1961).
114. E.g., CAL. EVw. CODE § 915 (West 1966).
115. It is improper to comment in court upon the exercise of a privilege.
E.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 913 (West 1966).
116. Cf. Louisell, supra note 19, at 113, citing comments of Professors Morgan
and McCormick with respect to the relatively uncontroversial nature of the privilege.
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ret for long. In the future, as the negative privilege to be silent be-
comes the positive compulsion to testify, the public will doubtless begin
to learn of defendants who are condemned by revelation in open court of
their private marital acts and communications, or of spouses who are im-
prisoned for contempt of court for refusing to so testify. And it may
well be that even persons who, in ignorance of the marital privilege, did
not formerly hesitate to confide in their spouses because they took confi-
dentiality for granted, 17 will choose their words more carefully in the
new-found knowledge that the privilege and its protection do not exist. 18
3. The "Non-Verbal" Marital Relation
The final argument presented by the Advisory Committee is that
"quite unlike marriage," the relationships whose privileges are retained
"are essentially and almost exclusively verbal in nature.""" I do
not dispute the "essentially verbal" nature of the psychotherapist-
patient or clergyman-penitent relationship, nor would I contend that
the average marriage is "almost exclusively" a verbal relationship.
However, the conclusion that verbal communication in complete free-
dom, confidence, and privacy is anything but an absolute necessity
in a marriage is, at the very least, beyond the competence of the
Advisory Committee, and in fact would likely be rejected out-of-hand
by the very psychotherapists and clergymen referred to above. As
expressed by Professor Louisell,
A marriage without the right of complete privacy of communica-
tion would necessarily b'e an imperfect union. Utter freedom of
marital communication from all government supervision, constraint,
control or observation, save only when the communications are for
117. By definition a "confidential" communication is not intended or expected
to be revealed, in court or otherwise. For the person who believes that the loyalty
and discretion of his or her spouse will be sufficient to assure confidentiality, if
nothing else abolition of the privilege will prove a rude shock to prior expectations.
118. But if the communications privilege were now to be abolished, publicity
about the change might reach large segments of the population of a state.
One might then expect a decrease in communication between spouses which
could lead to marital disharmony.
Comment, Marital Privileges and the Right to Testify, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 196, 200
n. 25 (1966). See also N.Y. Ti. LAw. PRoJEcr 142; Comment, Posthumous Privilege
in California, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 606, 609 (1961).
On the other hand, if the privilege is abolished, every effort should be made to
insure that the word does spread. If it is important that people be informed of the
rights they do have, it may be even more vital that they be informed of those they
have lost, so that individuals who were aware of their privileges (or took confidentiality
for granted) previously will be disabused of their now-incorrect assumptions prior to
acting upon them to their prejudice. Unfortunately, however, abolition presumably
would be retroactive to expose communications made while a privilege still existed.
119. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FED. R. Evm. 505, 34 L. Ed. 2d,
No. 5 at 49-50 (1973).
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an illegal purpose, is a psychological necessity for the perfect ful-
fillment of marriage. Recognition by the state that spouses possess
such right of confidential communication by reason of the nature
of their relationship, promotes the public policy of furthering and
safeguarding the objectives of marriage just as other institutions in
the area of domestic relations or family law promote it.120
It will come as no surprise to any married person that experts
in the field have reached conclusions similar to that of Professor
Louisell.' 2-
B. General Criticism of the Communication Privilege
There are other criticisms which have been made of the marital
communication privilege-and indeed of communication privileges in
general-which the Advisory Committee did not expressly recognize,
but which no doubt colored some of its attitudes and merit brief
discussion.
One pervasive theme in attacks on communication privileges is
that they are merely the result of the successful lobbying efforts of
various pressure groups to inflate the status or prestige of particular
professions.122  With respect to marital privileges, or course, this
argument is patently absurd unless there is some powerful "married
couples' lobby" of which I am unaware. Furthermore, reality seems
to belie this premise. It is unlikely, for example, that accountants
have a more powerful lobby than doctors; yet in some states the
former enjoy a privilege while the latter do not.'123  Moreover, the
very fact that every state in the Union and every western nation has
recognized most or all of the privileges in question for several cen-
turies would seem to indicate that if there is some pressure group
behind each privilege it has been very persuasive.
A second common complaint (applicable primarily, I assume,
to criminal cases) is that the privilege only protects the confidences
of a wrongdoer.'2 4  This is the same argument that in the past has
been so often raised to deny the civil rights of criminal suspects, and
it displays the same flaws in the context of marital privilege. It re-
120. Louisell, supra, n.19, at 113.
121. See n.82 supra.
122. A good example of this argument is found in Ladd, supra note 8, at 556,
572. See also McCoRMIcK § 77, at 159. At least one commentator sees this as a
clear, if unexpressed, motivation for the Advisory Committee's abolition of state priv-
ileges. Dunham, supra n.8, at 30.
123. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-216 (1970); see Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp.
322, 324 (S.D. Ga. 1957).
124. E.g., 'The marriage relation of criminals deserves no encouragement serving
to protect them in the perpetration of their crimes." Comment, Privileged Testimony
of Husband and Wife in California, 19 CALIF. L. REv. 390, 412 (1931).
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verses the presumption of innocence and proceeds on the assumption
that he who is suspect is most likely guilty, and if he is not he has
nothing to hide. This is not the place to respond generally to this
form of argument, or to attempt to illustrate that the innocent are
the true beneficiaries of scrupulous protection of suspects' rights.
Adequate response by others, however, is not lacking.'25 Suffice
it to say that, at least as regards marital privilege, the argument has no
validity. It is the innocent spouse as well as the guilty one who suf-
fers the effect of compelled betrayal. The betrayal need not be of
"wrongdoing," for the party spouse may be innocent; and the com-
munication revealed may be one made by the witness, not the party
spouse. Furthermore, spousal condemnation of a defendant, if
repugnant to society, is equally so whether the final verdict is con-
viction or acquittal. But most importantly the privilege exists to pro-
tect or foster the extra-judicial conduct of one who may never
be a suspect or a defendant. To focus only on the ultimate wrong-
doer who "goes free" is an old tactic, and, I trust, a thoroughly dis-
credited one.
There is one aspect of the above criticism of the communica-
tion privilege, especially that criticism relied on by the Advisory Com-
mittee, which seems to have been overlooked by those seeking justifi-
cation for its abolition: Even the most vehement critics of the privi-
lege do not recommend its abolition, but only its restriction; it is to be
entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge in individual cases. Thus
Hutchins and Slesinger, having completed their oft-cited attack on
marital privilege, conclude that it might "be restricted, with the
understanding that it is automatically waived wherever crucial evi-
dence can be obtained in no other way.' 2 6 And McCormick, having
put forth essentially the same argument against the privilege, and
having added his own view that "emotion and sentiment" are the real
source of the privilege, offers his solution:
[We should] recognize ...that the privilege is not an absolute
but a qualified one, which must yield if the trial judge finds that
the evidence of the communication is required in the due adminis-
tration of justice.' 27
125. For example, Justice Douglas, dissenting in Draper v. United States, points
out:
[the rule we fashion is for the innocent and guilty alike. If the word of the
informer on which the present arrest was made is sufficient to make the ar-
rest legal, his word would also protect the police who, acting on it, hauled the
innocent citizen off to jail.
358 U.S. 307, 314-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf., e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
486 (1966).
126. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 83, at 686.
127. MCCoRMIcK § 86, at 174 [emphasis added]. Professor McCormick goes on
to suggest what standards the judge should apply:
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Whether or not a discretionary privilege is the "solution" will be dis-
cussed below.12 At this point it should simply be noted that even
some of the most ardent critics of the communication privilege, in-
cluding the only two cited by the Advisory Committee, do not believe
that their criticism warrants its total abolition.
C. The Advisory Committee and the Testimonial Privilege
The only aspect of marital privilege retained by the Proposed
Rules is that relating to testimony against a spouse-what has been
referred to as the testimonial privilege. Rule 505 (a) provides:
An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to pre-
vent his spouse from testifying against him.
Rule 505(b) allows the witness spouse to claim the privilege in the
accused's behalf if he is absent; and Rule 505(c) sets out various
exceptions to the privilege, which will not be dealt with here.129
What the Rules have left, then, is a testimonial privilege applicable
only in criminal cases, held only by the accused spouse. Here the
Advisory Committee has inexplicably opted for precisely the reverse
of what sound policy (and most authorities, even those most critical
of marital privilege) would seem to dictate: they have adopted the
wrong form of the wrong privilege, and have given it to the wrong
spouse.
1. The Wrong Privilege
As between the marital testimony privilege, which the Advisory
Committee adopted, and the communication privilege, which they re-
jected, it is the former which has generally received more criticism.
Wigmore, although he denounced the "anti-marital" (testimonial)
privilege as "illogical and unfounded," and an "indefensible obstruc-
tion to truth,"130 nevertheless considered the criteria for retention
of the communication privilege to be fully satisfied. 31  Bernard
The judge could then protect the marital confidence when it should be pro-
tected, namely, when the material fact sought to be established by the com-
munication is not substantially controverted and may be proven with reason-
able convenience by other evidence.
Id. A similar discretionary solution is suggested for other privileges. Id. at § 77.
See also McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 218, 220-21
(1956); Dunham, supra note 8, at 36. This has been the approach in England. See
note 47 supra.
128. See text accompanying note 168 infra.
129. Proposed FED. R. EviD. 505, 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5 at 48-49 (1973). For a
detailed criticism of these exceptions see Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Law of Privilege, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1287, 1338-40 (1969).
130. 8 WIGMORE § 2228, at 218, 221.
131. Id. at § 2332.
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Witkin states in his work on California Evidence that although
"MIany authorities consider the theory [of the testimonial privilege]
unsound and the privilege undesirable,"'132 nonetheless "[m]ost of the
critics of the [testimonial] privilege are satisfied that the social
considerations which support the communications privilege are sub-
stantial and that it should be retained."' 3  Similar sentiments have
been expressed in other quarters. In a personal injury action in
California the petitioner sought a mandamus ruling which would
havq added a further exception to the "generally disfavored" testi-
monial privilege. Both the petitioner and the court took pains to
point out that no inroad was intended on the communication privi-
lege:
Petitioner is not attempting to do away with the privilege pro-
vided by the section concerning communications between spouses.
Our discussion throughout this opinion will have no reference to
that type of privilege as it is universally agreed that such limited
privilege is desirable.134
And in recent years many states and several "uniform" codification
proposals have made just this choice-abolition or weakening of the
testimonial privilege and retention of the communication privilege. 185
It is evident, therefore, that the Advisory Committee adopts the
privilege most often criticized and rejects the one most often sup-
ported, thus putting the new Federal Rules immediately at odds with
the weight of authority, the trend of state legislation, and any hopes
of ultimate federal-state uniformity.
2. The Wrong Form
Rule 505 is restricted to criminal proceedings; in federal civil ac-
132. B. Witkin, CAIFOnRNIA EVIDENCE § 828, at 774 (1966).
133. Id. § 838, at 782.
134. Stein v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App. 2d 21, 23 n.*, 344 P.2d 406, 407
n.1 (1959) [emphasis added]. See also, e.g., Orfield, The Husband-Wife Privileges in
Federal Criminal Procedure, 24 OMO ST. L.J. 144, 164-65, 171 (1963); Comment,
2 CA EF. L. REv. 148, 149 (1913); Note, 33 TuL. L. REV. 884, 887 (1959).
It is interesting, considering that the Proposed Federal Rules are promulgated in
the name of the Supreme Court, that in Stein the court refused to recognize the pro-
posed new exceptions, no matter how desirable, insisting that "If [the privilege] is to
be changed, it must be done by the Legislature and not by the courts." Id. at 24,
344 P.2d at 407. Cf. Louisell & Crippen, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REv.
413, 414 (1956).
135. Many of the statutes are collected in Comment, Marital Privileges and the
Right to Testify, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 196, 199 n.19 (1966); and Note, Competency of
One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does
Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359,
365 (1952). This choice was made by both the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
215 (1942) and the UNIFom Rui s OF EVIDENCE rule 23(2) (1953). Contrast the
recent reform of English law, note 47 supra.
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tions the testimonial privilege will not apply. Yet an examination
of the many authorities who have inveighed against the testimonial
privilege reveals that their criticism was directed to the availability of
the privilege either in criminal proceedings only,136 or in both
civil and criminal. 137  I have found no instance of approval of the
privilege in criminal proceedings only. The only reason given for the
Advisory Committee's decision is its conclusion that "[i]t is believed
to represent the one aspect of marital privilege thd continuation of
which is warranted."'"" The Note to Section 505 also states that
"[a]bout 30 jurisdictions recognize' a testimonial privilege held by
an accused. 13 9  However, there is no mention of whether these (or
other) jurisdictions, like California, also recognize a privilege in civil
cases. In any event, this would be a strange place for the Ad-
visory Committee to bow to state authority, since it openly rejects
such precedent in abolishing the marital communication and other
privileges. Thus what in fact prompted its "belief' that retention of
this much-maligned privilege was justified only in criminal proceed-
ings remains obscured behind the Committee's less-than-informative
Note. 140
It would seem that one either accepts or rejects the premises on
which the testimonial privilege is based; if accepted as valid for
criminal proceedings, they remain valid for civil proceedings.-4
Even assuming that there could be found a difference in degree be-
tween the "dissension" or "repugnance" created by one and the oth-
er-and this distinction has yet to be demonstrated-it seems doubt-
ful that there would be a sufficient difference to justify adoption of
the privilege in one form of proceeding and its total rejection in all
others, thereby severely curtailing the intended policy effect of the
former.
136. For example, Jeremy Bentham, at his most colorful, railed at turning a man's
house not just into his castle, but into a "den of thieves." 5 RATmONALF OF JUDrICAL.
EVIDENCE 332, 339-45 (1827), quoted in 8 WIGMORE § 2228, at 218.
137. See generally 8 WIGMom § 2228. Cf. Comment, The Marital "For and
Against" Privilege in California, 8 STAN. L. REv. 420, 436-37 (1956), urging that
whatever treatment is accorded the testimonial privilege, it be uniformly applied to
civil and criminal cases.
138. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FED. R. Evm. 505, 34 L. Ed. 2d,
No. 5, at 49 (1973). There is also a citation to Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74
(1958). Note, however, that the actual holding of Hawkins, a Mann Act case, is re-
jected by the specific language of Rule 505(c).
139. 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5, at 45 (1973).
140. Certainly the content and clarity of the Advisory Committee's Notes often
leave much to be desired. Cf. Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and the Law of
Privileges, 15 WAYNE L. Rev. 1287, 1337 (1969).
141. Cf. Louisell, supra note 19, at 122.
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Moreover, whatever arguments might be made for favoring the
testimonial privilege in only criminal cases also support abolition of its
criminal application first. Thus if it be said there is a greater "re-
pugnancy" in denying a man his life or liberty on the strength of his
spouse's condemnation than is felt when only his property is at
stake, it can also be argued that the least defensible and most "re-
pugnant" aspect of the privilege is that which allows thieves and mur-
derers to go free for such reasons of "sentiment." If it be contended
that condemnation by a spouse in a criminal case will cause greater
marital dissension than in a civil case, it can be countered that a
marriage broken by a criminal conviction and a long prison sentence
will not likely survive in any event and, even if it does, it is less
worthy of saving than that of a law-abiding citizen guilty only of neg-
ligence or commercial misfeasance. 142 While I agree with neither po-
sition because I believe that the privilege is warranted in both civil and
criminal proceedings, I consider the choice made by the Advisory
Committee to be arbitrary, standing as it does naked and unexplained
in circumstances calling for the most careful evaluation and explicit
justification before state prerogatives and policies are ignored or un-
dermined.
3. The Wrong Spouse
The testimonial privilege retained by the Proposed Rules is held
only by the accused spouse. Again, the only explanation given is that
more states give the privilege to the accused than give it to the wit-
ness spouse.' 43 As indicated above, deference to state practice is an
unlikely motivation considering the Advisory Committee's general
attitude toward state precedent. More importantly, the choice seems
to be ill-advised on the merits, as many of the more recent statutory
formulations have recognized. If the rationale for the privilege is
one of avoiding marital dissension, then the only spouse able to
make a decision to testify on the basis of whether the marriage is
worth saving is the witness spouse; the accused is understandably
unlikely to be able to put aside his or her strong personal interest
in suppressing adverse testimony, and would be likely to invoke the
privilege regardless of marital considerations. If "repugnancy" is the
rationale, it applies primarily to the spectre of compelling a spouse
to condemn his or her mate on pain of contempt; however, if the
witness spouse chooses voluntarily to testify, whether out of a sense of
142. See note 124 supra.
143. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FED. R. Evm. 505, 34 L. Ed. 2d,
No. 5, at 49 (1973).
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duty to tell the truth or out of ill feeling toward the accused, society will
less likely be offended.144 Moreover, giving the privilege only to the
witness spouse vitiates several of the criticisms most often leveled at the
testimonial privilege, particularly the criticism that a marriage in which
one spouse will voluntarily condemn the other is not worth saving,145
and that the accused should not be "consulted in determining whether
justice shall have its course against him.' 141
This formulation is not, however, without its possible draw-
backs. It has been pointed out that, as the sole holder of the
testimonial privilege, a spouse would be tempted to blackmail or other-
wise coerce the accused by use of this "weapon" of testimony."'
Perhaps a witness spouse might be subjected to coercion by the pros-
ecution to compel his or her testimony;' 4s or the witness might be
coerced by the accused not to testify. All of these fears no doubt
have some foundation, but they seem far too remote to justify grant-
ing the privilege to the party spouse. A truly vindictive spouse
could find other ways to coerce the accused, including a threat to
cooperate fully (short of testimony) with the prosecution, and there
has always been the problem of coerced statements (especially con-
fessions) or coerced silence of a witness, both of which can be and
are regularly dealt with by proper judicial awareness and supervision.
D. General Criticism of the Testimonial Privilege
Although the Advisory Committee did not discuss them specifi-
cally, there is no dearth of critical comments directed against the testi-
monial privilege, ranging from Bentham14 9 to McCormick ("an ar-
144. See generally CAL. L. REv. COMM'N STuDY, supra note 49, at F-16 & F-17.
But cf. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.). Of
course, this argument does not apply to the communication privilege, which must at
least belong to the communicating spouse, party or witness, if it is to foster the freedom
to speak without fear of disclosure by those privy to the conversation. An interesting
variation is suggested in Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and the Law of Privi-
leges, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1287, 1336 (1969), in which the author attempts to provide
for the seemingly remote situation in which the party spouse desires the witness
spouse to testify, but the latter wishes to remain silent-a situation the author believes
does not warrant allowance of a privilege-by requiring that both spouses invoke the
privilege before it will be recognized.
145. E.g., McCoRMcK § 66, at 145.
146. 8 WIGMORE § 2228, at 216-17. See also Note, Competency of One Spouse
to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate
to Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38 VA. L. Rv. 359, 375 (1952).
147. Comment, The Marital "For and Against" Privilege in California, 8 STAN.
L. REv. 420, 437-38 (1956).
148. N.Y. TR. LAw. PROJECt 145, citing allegations made in Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74 (1953).
149. See note 136 supra.
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6haic survival of a mystical religious dogma") 50 to Wigmore ("illogical
and unfounded").' 5' In general, the thrust of these criticisms is that
(a) the "dissension" caused by adverse testimony is minimal or non-
existent; (b) the "repugnance" at spousal condemnation is "mere sen-
timent" unworthy of judicial recognition; and (c) whatever the valid-
ity of (a) and (b), neither policy is sufficiently important to justify
interference with the fact-finding process. Whether or not one agrees
with the latter conclusion, the decision as to which policy should
prevail should be a legislative judgment the states make individually,
and not one the Advisory Committee or the Federal Rules preempt.
Thus, while I welcome the fact that the Proposed Rules retain at least
this limited privilege, it would be far better if the Rules simply directed
recognition of the states' privileges, so that those which did not desire
to sacrifice the fact-finding process to a controversial public policy would
not have that choice forced upon them in their federal courts.
It is also interesting to note that most of the above criticisms
of the testimonial privilege were made in the context of assumed re-
tention of the often-overlapping communication privilege.15 2  Wheth-
er in the context of total abolition of marital privilege those criticisms
of the' testimonial aspect would be so impassioned is a matter for
speculation. It seems certain only that, as indicated earlier, these
authorities would scarcely have countenanced the total reversal in
precedent-adoption of testimonial and abolition of communication
privilege-contained in the Proposed Rules.
IV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Provision for Application of State Privileges
A number of suggestions have been made as to how the Federal
Rules should deal with privileges, and certainly all have some merit.
The basic options are three: (1) adopt state privileges expressly;
(2) leave privileges entirely out of the Rules to be dealt with, as
at present; by the courts on a case-by-case basis; or (3) abolish
state-created privileges in favor of new federal ones. Within these
alternatives are many variations: apply state privileges only in diver-
sity cases, or in all federal proceedings; abolish only those state privi-
leges more (or less) restrictive than their new federal counterparts;
150. McCovnicx § 66, at 145.
151. 8 WIGMORE § 2228, at 218. See the authorities collected in Id. at 218-21,
and those cited in notes 134-35 supra.
152. Id.
[Vol. 61:13531386
HeinOnline  -- 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1386 1973
MARITAL PRIVILEGE
and so forth. The Advisory Committee opted for choice (3), which
choice I would reject for reasons heretofore discussed. As between
choices (1) and (2), the second is especially appealing to those who
feel the courts are already doing an adequate job of applying state
privileges when required by Erie or when otherwise thought necessary
or desirable.153  The first, however, offers the greater certainty and
predictability which is so necessary when dealing with rules intended
to have an effect on pre-litigation, out-of-court conduct. It provides
one standard-the state's-for the courts to apply, and one rule
-the state's-for the individual to follow. A particular communica-
tion would either be privileged in all proceedings within a state or in
none, thus ensuring a degree of predictability calculated to create
expectations upon which conduct rationally can be based. In the
area of privileges, uniformity between the federal court sitting in San
Francisco and the state court across the street seems of far greater
practical import than uniformity between the federal court in San Fran-
cisco and those in Denver, Pittsburgh, and Minneapolis.
B. Diversity and Federal Question Cases
Most authorities have agreed since the distinction between diver-
sity and federal question jurisdiction first became significant, that state-
created privileges should or must be recognized in diversity cases be-
cause the federal interest in the litigation is minimal where the
state supplies the law of decision. However, almost as many
authorities seem to agree that in federal question cases, the fed-
eral interest in the litigation is sufficient to outweigh the state
policy behind the creation of the privilege.:' 4  The first proposition
is difficult to deny. In an attempt to do so, the Advisory Committee
first offended the legal community by deprecating state privileges as
mere devices for the "suppression of information."'15 5 The Committee
then asserted that a question of privilege arises generally "quite by
accident," so that "the litigation involves something substantively
devoid of relation to the privilege."'5  One wonders whether the
Committee would make the same assertion if each state law which a
federal court was called upon to apply carried with it the proviso:
"provided, however, that this statute shall be of no force or effect
153. See, e.g., the views of Judge Friendly, 119 CoNG. RFc. 5004 (daily ed.
March 19, 1973), who is unconvinced that there is a need for any federal evidentiary
rules. Cf. N.Y. TR. LAw. PRoJEcT 35 (favoring omission altogether of the subject of
privileges from the Federal Rules).
154. See authorities cited in notes 34 and 67-68 supra.
155. See text accompanying notes 16-30 supra.
156. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FED. R. Evm. 501, 34 L. Ed. 2d,
No. 5, at 39 (1973) [emphasis added]. See also note 34 supra.
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whenever its enforcement would require violation of an evidentiary
privilege." Yet that is precisely the thrust of a state-created privi-
lege, which is in effect a decision that if enforcement of any state law
(except those specifically singled out for special treatment as an excep-
tion to some privilege) requires violation of an evidentiary privilege, the
policy behind the privilege outweighs that behind the particular law in
question and the former must prevail. States could, of course, write
such clauses into their statute books; that they should have to do so to
avoid a federal court's overzealous enforcement of their own state law
is absurd.' 57 The conviction is inescapable that "[t]o fail to recognize
a state-created privilege in a suit on a state-created claim that is in
federal court only because of the accident of diversity of citizenship [is]
quite indefensible. " 8
Those who argue further against application of state privileges
in diversity cases because there would be a dual system to contend with
and "even-handed justice" requires uniformity between diversity and
federal question cases,' 59 in fact make out the primary argument
for adoption of state privileges in all federal proceedings, since com-
plete uniformity-state and federal-can only be achieved in this
way. '8 Nevertheless, when it comes to federal question cases one
must concede a substantial federal interest in the enforcement of fed-
eral laws. Even so, I question the blanket decision that that in-
terest necessarily and in all instances outweighs the state's interest
in maintaining a privilege in force within its borders. Certainly there
are instances in which the balance can tip either way. For example,
the difference between a state crime and a federal crime may be the
difference between the holdup of a corner grocery store or of the
federal bank next door. The state's interest in dealing with such
crime is essentially the same in either case-protection of the life
and property of its citizens, and deterrence of further crime. Both
the teller and the grocer, the shopper and the bank patron, would be
likely to be local citizens. The same police officers would respond
157. Compare the remarks of Professor Korn:
[Ilt does not lie in the mouths of the federal judiciary to say to the state,
We will provide a "juster justice" by sacrificing one of your substantive
policies (i.e., that underlying the privilege) in order to effectuate others (i.e.,
those underlying the state law governing the merits of the controversy.)
Second Circuit Conference 77. See also Degnan, supra note 8, at 300; McNichols,
supra note 8, at 193.
158. Wright, supra note 29, at 573.
159. E.g., Ladd, supra note 8, at 571, 573.
160. See note 32 supra. Consider that state conformity to federal privileges,
even if theoretically feasible, would require agreement and affirmative action by
fifty state legislatures, whereas federal conformity to state privileges can be achieved
by the drafting and adoption of one federal rule.
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to both alarms and ultimately investigate both crimes, with possible
federal assistance in the case of the bank. If the state has weighed
and determined that its enforcement of its criminal laws is not signifi-
cantly hampered by application of, for example, its marital privilege
in the grocery holdup case, need the federal policymakers really fear
that the effect on federal criminal laws will be measurably different?'61
Moreover, should those policymakers ignore the clear state interest
which is involved in enforcement of the federal criminal law? The
same analysis might be made of state and federal antitrust laws:
Should not identical policies, often with identical provisions, 162 be
enforced within a given jurisdiction with at least comparable applica-
tions of privilege?
There are, nevertheless, federal questions-especially those direct-
ly involving interstate activities, nationwide conspiracies, or the states
themselves, and those concerned with federal statutes having no state
counterparts-for which there is a strong argument for application of
federal privileges, not because of a lesser state interest in the policy
behind the privilege, but because of a lesser state interest in enforce-
ment of the law of decision. How can these instances be taken into
account? I believe the most viable solution is a compromise, similar
to that suggested by several critics of particular privileges:' 63 provide
for application of state privileges in all diversity and other cases in
which state law provides the rule of decision, but give the court some
discretion in federal question cases to apply a state privilege or not,
according to the nature of the litigation and the exigencies of the case.
Where the state interest in the decisional law in strong, the privilege
should be applied; where it is not, and where the evidence is truly
necessary to the adjudicative process and cannot otherwise be ob-
tained (and where, of course, the Constitution does not compel its
application), the privilege might be denied. 6 4 This is not a perfect
solution but it provides the flexibility which is necessary when-
ever a conflict of policies is inevitable and no broad generalization
seems adequate for all situations. 6 5
161. Compare Louisell, supra note 19, at 123.
162. Compare, for example, the provisions of California's Cartwright Act, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16,700 et seq. (West 1964) with those of the federal Sherman
and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
163. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
164. This is hardly a radical suggestion. For example, proposed Rule 508 would
provide a qualified privilege for trade secrets, balancing protection and justice by the
application of judicial discretion.
165. Compare the "interest analysis" approach suggested in Comment, Eviden-
tiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 CAin'. L. Rnv. 640, 649-56 (1964).
An alternative solution, less flexible but more certain, might be for individual fed-
eral statutes to provide expressly that state privileges shall not apply, where such a
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C. A Federal Marital Privilege
Thus far my conclusions and recommendations have applied
generally to all privileges, on the theory that the best solution is a
general one which will encompass marital and other privileges, thus
obviating the need for Congress to debate and decide each separate-
ly, and preserving for the individual states their prerogative to make
such decisions. However, failing a general solution, presumably
there will be a body of federal privileges promulgated to apply either
in all federal proceedings or in federal question cases only1 00 In
such event, following are my views on marital privilege, most of
which have already been set forth in the body of this article.
1. The Communication Privilege
There are several principal reasons the marital communication
privilege should be included in any federal codification:
(a) Like all communication privileges, this one is only as effec-
tive as the breadth of the forums in which it applies. To deny it in
all federal proceedings is to deal a severe blow to the policy decisions
of the individual states which have created or adopted the privilege.
Especially in a diversity context, such a usurpation of state preroga-
tive cannot be justified.
(b) Of all the aspects of marital privilege, this is the one which
most states continue to support. Therefore any hope we might
have of ultimate uniformity between state and federal courts in a giv-
en jurisdiction would be frustrated by a rule which at its adoption is
opposed to virtually every modem statute and rule in America.
policy is thought desirable by the drafters of the legislation in question. This is al-
ready true of, for example, the Bankruptcy Act § 21a, 11 U.S.C. § 44a (1964).
According to at least one knowledgeable member of the Advisory Committee,
federal courts already apply a discretionary approach to state privileges, especially in
unreported decisions relying more on "reflexive responses" than on stare decisis.
Weinstein, supra note 8, at 373 & n.82. As Judge Weinstein points out, the vast ma-
jority of decisions are of this type, and the federal courts almost instinctively apply
state privileges unless a clear injustice would result. Id.
166. One other possible circumstance in which new federal privileges would be
drafted is that suggested by Professor Wright, supra note 29, at 573: state privileges
would be applied (in diversity cases) in addition to whatever other privileges were
adopted for the federal courts. See also Korn, Second Circuit Conference 77. The
only disadvantage to this approach (in addition to its omission of federal question
cases, which could be remedied as suggested above) is the imposition on the states of
privileges which might be more liberal than they have deemed consistent with state
policy-arguably an interference with state policy that is no more justified than denial
of a privilege the state would recognize. If the suggestion does have merit, it is
primarily in federal question cases, where the state interest is the least and the federal
interest the greatest. Note, however, that a privilege available only in federal court
would have minimal effect on pre-litigation conduct.
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(c) There is simply no sound evidence against the efficacy or
policy of the privilege, and even those who have expressed their doubts
about its soundness have hesitated to recommend its outright aboli-
tion. While it is this writer's opinion that what empirical evidence
does exist-including our everyday experiences-supports the com-
munication privilege and the policies behind it, even if the evi-
dence is as yet inconclusive, the relationship which this privilege seeks
to protect is too important to our society to jeopardize (or even fail
to encourage) by hasty abolition on the basis of supposition, guesswork,
and unsupported sociological surmise. Judge Weinstein understated the
case when he said that abolition of a state-created privilege constitutes
"a significant legislative judgment!'1 7 by the rulemakers. If the burden
against it is not clearly carried, the privilege should prevail.
2. The Testimonial Privilege
The testimonial privilege is far more difficult than the commu-
nication privilege to evaluate. We are faced with two factors: the de-
sirability of deference to state legislative decisions to protect relation-
ships of primary state interest; and the cogent (if not entirely scientif-
ic) arguments against the merits of the privilege. If marital privi-
lege is to be curtailed, fewer state policy decisions would be thwarted
by abolition of the testimonial than by abolition of the communica-
tion privilege, since the testimonial privilege has found less support
among the states than the communication privilege. And if the latter
is retained, it will protect against at least the most repugnant instances
of antispousal testimony. Nevertheless, abolition of the testimonial
privilege will still interfere needlessly with the prerogatives of a great
many states, and if a compromise is necessary, perhaps a better one
would be a discretionary testimonial privilege, as recommended as a
compromise for federal question litigation. That is, rather than abol-
ish the testimonial privilege, I would merely leave it to the court's
discretion to disallow it in exceptional circumstances where testimony
is absolutely necessary in the interests of justice. This is a procedure
which would be more workable for the testimonial privilege than for
its communication counterpart, simply because the latter more strong-
ly affects pre-litigation conduct and thus requires a higher degree of
advance predictability. It is not sufficient, if a privilege is intended
to encourage free communication, that that communication may pos-
sibly be protected in some future proceedings. The effect of the
testimonial privilege, on the other hand, is primarily felt at or after
the proceeding in which it is invoked, and no significant pre-litiga-
167. Weinstein, supra note 8, at 372.
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tion conduct is predicated or dependent upon its existence. Thus,
while I personally favor retention of all state privileges, and would re-
tain both aspects of spousal privilege, I believe a discretionary com-
promise is at least a viable alternative for its controversial testimonial
aspect. The probable effect would be that federal trial courts would
take into consideration the existence (or nonexistence) of a state priv-
ilege in weighing whether to allow the federal counterpart, and thus the
overall result would be little different than the present practice. 08
V
A FINAL COMMENT
It is appropriate to point out, as others have done, that the
great majority of the new Federal Rules appear to be sound, well-
considered proposals reflecting the extremely high calibre of the
scholars, practitioners, and judges who made up the Advisory Com-
mittee. Perhaps it is for just this reason that so many in the legal
community are disappointed in the Committtee's disposition of privi-
leges and the justifications advanced for that disposition. Perhaps
also it is because I write as an attorney biased by both academic and prac-
tical training in litigation that I tend to agree with many (though not
all) of the reactions of the groups of trial attorneys who have criti-
cized the Rules' treatment of the marital privilege. No doubt all have
the same desire to "achieve justice" as any individual who helped to
draft the Rules. However, it is a fundamental tenet of our judicial
system that the ascertainment of truth is not necessarily the equiv-
alent of justice; it is not and never has been the ultimate goal
to be achieved always, at all costs. Compelled self-incrimina-
tion is just as distasteful-and as unjust-if conceded to be truthful
as if presumed false.1 9 Delayed trials are no less unjust if they
reach the truth than if they do not. 7' And invasion of the marital
chamber is no more acceptable when it brings out all the facts in liti-
gation than when it enforces policies against birth control or abor-
tion.' 7' In a system of law, truth is a means toward justice, not
necessarily an end in itself. Exactly what weight or effect should be
accorded conflicting means or conflicting ends is a matter of policy
168. Cf. note 165 supra.
169. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), certainly did not turn on the lack
of technical trustworthiness of a coerced confession.
170. See Strunk v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2260 (1973). In Strunk a violation
of the defendant's right to a speedy trial required dismissal of the indictment against
him, despite the sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial to establish his guilt.
171. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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whose resolution, in the context of our federal system (barring con-
stitutional imperatives), might best be left to the individual states
through their elected representatives. One thing is certain: Self-ap-
pointed commentators (like myself) and court-appointed advisors can
examine, analyze, and recommend, but in areas of either state or federal
interest, they should not usurp the policymaking function and take upon
themselves the legislative duty and prerogative to make the final decision.
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